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English Abstract 
This paper proposes an application of Enrique Dussel’s ethics of liberation to an issue 
of crucial importance to US minorities: the debate on affirmative action. Over the past 
fifty years, this debate has been framed in terms of the opposition between advocates of 
affirmative action who claim that it is needed in order to achieve the integration and 
participation of traditionally oppressed groups to society without which there is no 
equality of rights, and critics who argue that affirmative action violates equality by 
enforcing a double standard that undermines the ideal of a color-blind society. In this 
paper, I show how the basic principles of Dussel’s ethical theory (which are best 
expounded in his book Ethics of Liberation) allow us to address what I take to be the 
main demands of both advocates and critics of affirmative action in a satisfactory way.  
Resumen en español 
Este artículo propone una aplicación de la ética de la liberación de Enrique Dussel a 
una cuestión de importancia crucial para las minorías en Estados Unidos: el debate 
sobre la acción afirmativa. En los últimos cincuenta años, el debate ha estado 
enmarcado en términos de los defensores de la acción afirmativa, los cuales mantienen 
que es necesaria para alcanzar la integración y la participación de los grupos 
tradicionalmente oprimidos en la sociedad, sin lo que no hay igualdad de derechos, y 
los críticos que argumentan que la acción afirmativa viola la igualdad porque establece 
un doble estándar que socava el ideal de una sociedad insensible al color. En este 
artículo, muestro cómo los principios básicos de la teoría ética de Dussel (que son 
mejor expuestos en su libro Ética de la liberación) nos permiten satisfacer de forma 
satisfactoria lo que considero ser las principales demandas de los defensores y los 
críticos de la acción afirmativa. 
Resumo em português 
Este artigo propõe aplicar a ética de libertação de Enrique Dussel `a uma questão de 
 crucial importância para as minorias dos EUA: o debate sobre a ação afirmativa. Nos 
últimos 50 anos, este debate foi enquadrado em termos da oposição entre os 
defensores da ação afirmativa, que afirmam que esta é necessária para alcançar a 
integração e a participação dos grupos tradicionalmente oprimidos na sociedade, sem a 
qual não há igualdade de direitos, e os críticos da mesma, que argumentam que a ação 
afirmativa viola a igualdade, por que estabelece um duplo standard, que mina o ideal 
de uma sociedade que não vê cor. Neste artigo, mostro como os princípios básicos da 
teoria ética de Dussel (que são melhor explicados em seu livro Ética da Libertação) nos 
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permitem abordar de forma satisfatória o que eu acredito serem as principais 
demandas de ambos defensores e críticos da ação afirmativa. 
__________________________________________________________ 
 Two of the greatest philosophical contributions of Enrique Dussel have been his 
rejection of a conception of ethics often accepted by the major figures of the Western 
philosophical tradition as an abstract discipline that has no cultural roots and the central 
claims of which are deemed to have a universal validity in virtue of its independence 
from historical contingencies, and his attempt to articulate and defend an alternate 
conception of ethics as a human activity that, throughout its history, has been shaped by 
the political and economic interests of those who create it. In virtue of this, Dussel has 
shown how ethics has been used often throughout history to justify some cultural or 
social institutions (such as slavery or colonialism),[1] but also how it can also be 
employed to liberate individuals that have been oppressed by these institutions.  
 In particular, in the case of education, Dussel (1985, 12) has famously argued 
that, although universities and other higher education institutions in ‘periphery’ countries 
functioned as ‘brain-washing theaters’ in which students were taught to repeat and 
emulate fashionable trends of thought generated in European metropoles, the eventual 
recognition by some individuals in the ‘periphery’ of this role led them to question some 
key assumptions underlying this educational model, thus yielding a dismantlement of 
some social structures that fostered oppression. In particular, in the case of Freire, 
Dussel (2013, 312) remarks that his pedagogical views constitute a departure from a 
traditional notion of education because “without losing sight of [the importance of 
theoretical or moral intelligence], Freire aims, first and foremost, to educate the victims 
in the very historical, communitarian and real process through which they abandon their 
condition as victims.” Indeed, as Freire (1970) suggests rethinking the philosophical 
assumptions underlying traditional pedagogy to promote in students a critical and 
transformative activity geared towards their intellectual emancipation, his pedagogical 
proposal can be considered as a clear expression of one of the main desiderata of the 
philosophy of liberation which, as Dussel (1985, 173) maintains, is ‘to think what has 
never been thought before: the process of the liberation of dependent and peripheral 
countries’.              
 Now, even if there have been many successful applications of the central ideas 
that underpin philosophy of liberation in peripheral countries in the last forty years (for 
instance, in the case of the use of Freire’s ideas to design and implement literacy 
campaigns),[2] the philosophical project put forth by Dussel still leaves many issues 
open. Let me illustrate this with an example. Even though Dussel (2013, 47) 
characterizes his project as ‘a critical philosophy born in the periphery (from the 
perspective of the victims), which has the intention of being relevant on a global scale’, 
there has been so far relatively little work done on how Dussel’s ethics of liberation can 
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be applied to address the causes of disenfranchisement that afflict different oppressed 
and marginalized groups residing in ‘center’ countries such as the US.[3] My goal in this 
paper is to articulate and defend a potential application of Dussel’s ethics of liberation to 
address a contentious issue in the US: the access of historically vulnerable and 
marginalized groups in the US to higher education through affirmative action.  
 I will proceed in the following way. In the second section of the paper, I will 
present very succinctly the traditional debate between advocates and opponents of 
affirmative action policy in regards to the access of traditionally marginalized students to 
higher education, highlighting one major limitation that underpins the debate. In the third 
section, I will rehearse and discuss briefly what I take to be the three core principles of 
Dussel’s ethics of liberation –namely, the material principle, the formal principle and the 
feasibility principle– and I will show how these principles relate to each other. In the 
fourth section, I will show how these principles provide a framework that enables us to 
address the issue of affirmative action in regards to access to higher education in a way 
that bypasses the limitations of the traditional debate. Finally, in the last section, I will 
provide a brief conclusion. 
I. The Traditional Debate 
 In order to understand the traditional debate between advocates and opponents 
of affirmative action, it is first crucial to understand what affirmative action consists of. 
Although there are many different characterizations of the concept, I will take as a point 
of reference the following definition (Fullinwider 2013): “‘Affirmative action’ means 
positive steps taken to increase the representation of women and minorities in areas of 
employment, education, and culture from which they have been historically excluded.” It 
is important to observe that this characterization is different from the way in which the 
notion of affirmative action was presented in one of the first official documents in which 
it is used:  
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant because 
of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action 
to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during 
employment without regard to their race, creed, color or national origin. 
(Executive Order 10925, sec. 301) 
 As we can appreciate, although the original intent of the affirmative action was to 
eliminate discrimination with vis-à-vis persons employed by federal contractors on the 
basis of certain features such as race or national origin (which is a goal that is 
consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the US Constitution, in particular with the 
14th amendment), the notion of affirmative action that Fullinwinder presents is far more 
substantial (and potentially more controversial) since it involves not only the 
enforcement of the negative right of individuals not to be discriminated as members of 
certain groups in areas such as education or employment but also the enforcement of a 
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positive right to a larger representation in these areas to ensure genuine integration and 
participation –a right that has been typically enforced through the implementation of 
preferential selections for certain individuals in regards to access to education or 
employment on the basis of their being members of certain groups.[4]     
 This process of preferential selection, which has been implemented in some way 
or another by many American universities, has generated a deep controversy in the last 
five decades. Two of the crucial questions that have driven the debate are the following 
ones: why should we give preference to certain individuals (in particular, regarding 
access to higher education) based on their belonging to a certain group? Are there good 
reasons to offer to some individuals access to higher education institutions over others 
that may be as equally qualified as the preferred ones? Several philosophers have 
articulated and critically assessed during the last four decades different responses to 
these questions. For instance, some have contended that affirmative action is justified 
because certain minority groups (e.g., Blacks) have been discriminated de jure until 
very recently in comparison to other groups which still enjoy unearned advantages. On 
the basis of this, some authors have then argued that the use of affirmative action is 
justified in decisions about access to higher education because it provides a path to 
equality by redressing past wrongs (Thomson 1973) and/or by neutralizing unearned 
advantages enjoyed by privileged groups (Rachels 1979).  
 In virtue of this, it is patent that some defenses of affirmative action have been 
supported by arguments that rely on notions of justice and desert. But this is 
troublesome for advocates of affirmative action because critics have in many occasions 
developed arguments opposing affirmative action that also rely on these very notions of 
justice and desert. For instance, Goldman (1976, 191) has argued that ‘it seems unjust 
for a society to set standards of achievement and then to thwart the expectations of 
those who have met those standards’. And, in a parallel fashion, Sher has contended 
that, in the case of individuals who were not able to succeed in school because of 
material or other privations, it is the case that:   
(…) reverse discrimination to restore precisely the competitive position that a 
person would have had if he had not been prevented from working would not be 
desirable [because] actual effort creates desert in a way that merely possible 
effort does not. (1975, 166) 
 In fact, the panorama is more somber for supporters of affirmative action. Not 
only have their adversaries mounted counter-arguments based on the very notions they 
invoke to justify affirmative action, but it seems to be the case that affirmative action is 
an inconsistent or self-undermining policy because, in spite of the fact that it was 
embraced by the civil rights movement in the late 1960’s to further some of its key goals 
(e.g., achieving a color-blind society with equal rights and equal opportunity for all its 
members), it allegedly undermines those very goals: 
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The civil rights movement (...) should turn its attention back to its first principles –
the zealous regard for equal opportunity and the promotion of color-blind law and 
social policy– and away from color conscious remedies that abandon principle 
and lead us further away from a society free of the bane of racial discrimination. 
(Abram 1986, 1312) 
 This objection is particularly trenchant because it rests on a key principle that is 
enshrined in the fourteenth amendment, which is that of equality of all before the law.[5] 
This principle is so deeply ingrained in the American judicial system that courts have 
upheld several challenges to affirmative action in access to higher education (Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke, Hopwood v. Texas and Schuette v. Coalition to 
defend affirmative action) by appealing to this principle, though they have upheld the 
validity of the use of affirmative action to further diversity, which is recognized as a 
‘compelling state interest’ as long as its use is ‘narrowly tailored’ (Grutter v. Bollinger). In 
virtue of this, it seems that one cannot mount a solid case for affirmative action based 
on equality considerations because the principle of equality of all before the law cuts 
both ways.[6] On one side, it can be used to argue persuasively for affirmative action on 
the basis that equality requires the full integration and participation of minority groups 
that have been traditionally excluded via a preferential treatment. On the other side, it 
can be also used to argue against affirmative action on the basis that the use of different 
standards for different groups perpetuates a color-conscious society in which minorities 
are often stigmatized. 
 As we can appreciate, the debate on affirmative action has essentially revolved 
around the concepts of equality, justice, desert and diversity in the last five decades, 
and a substantial number of authors have made attempts to find a balance between 
competing demands. In particular, the vast majority of the legal and philosophical 
literature on affirmative action has addressed a version of at least one of the two 
following questions to either defend or criticize its use: (a) is there a way to justify and 
preserve the use of affirmative action in a way that does not involve either infringing on 
justice and/or upsetting desert and (b) does the right of individuals to equal treatment 
trump the state’s compelling interest to promote diversity?  
 Despite the importance of these two questions, I believe that a sustained focus 
on them has blinded us to a point clearly made by Justice O’Connor in the majority 
opinion written for Grutter: ‘Race-conscious admission policies must be limited in time. 
(…) Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this 
fundamental equal protection principle.’ As the majority of court made clear, affirmative 
action understood as a set of preferential policies meant to enforce a positive right of 
certain communities to a larger representation was never intended to be permanent and 
is solely justified as a temporary relief measure. But this in turn raises a question: what 
should we do to avoid turning affirmative action into a perennial policy while being true 
to the ideals of equality and justice that initially motivated it? The lack of interest on this 
question, which has not been addressed in the legal or philosophical literature to the 
best of my knowledge, constitutes a limitation of the way in which the debate has been 
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framed. Now, I believe that Dussel’s ethics of liberation provides us with a potentially 
interesting way to address this question. However, prior to showing how Dussel’s ethical 
system can be applied to this issue, it is important to be clear on the key principles that 
underly Dussel’s theory, so I will present them in the next section. 
II. Dussel’s Ethics of Liberation 
 Although Dussel’s ethics of liberation is an incredibly rich and complex view that 
enables us to account for various issues that traditional moral theories also address 
such as the subjugation of women, it can be characterized as being underpinned by a 
key insight. For Dussel (2013, 55), an ethics of liberation ‘unfolds in its own way from 
the exercise of an ethical critique, where the negated dignity of the life of the victim, 
oppressed or excluded, is affirmed.’ As this citation makes clear, the crucial insight on 
which an ethics of liberation rests is a concern for all those who are most oppressed or 
marginalized in any society. This idea is clearly captured in one of the key principles that 
lies at the heart of Dussel’s ethics, which he calls the material principle: 
The one who acts ethically ought to produce, reproduce and develop self-
responsibly the concrete life of each human subject, in a community of life, and 
inevitably out of a cultural and historical good life (...) that is shared instinctually 
and solidaristically. (2013, 104) 
   As we can see, the material principle, which states that ethical actions are those 
geared towards the development of all human lives (particularly, of those who are most 
oppressed or marginalized) rests on the value of solidarity. In virtue of this, in order to 
apply the material principle, we are required to do the following: (a) we must first identify 
those individuals who are the most oppressed or marginalized in a given social system 
and (b) we must address subsequently from their perspective why the social system in 
question fails them (i.e., why it oppresses them and marginalizes them). Consequently, 
the material principle grounds all ethical action on the recognition and vindication of the 
lives of those who make up the underside of society. 
 Dussel stresses in many places that, to be genuine, the application of the 
material principle must be accompanied not by a reform of political or social institutions 
(which is a change that leaves intact the structural conditions of oppression), but rather 
by: 
(...) transforming action [which], by contrast, judges and modifies the formal 
system from the life and the responsible discursiveness of any human subject, 
and, as the ultimate reference, of the victims. (2013, 395) 
 For Dussel, this transforming action is often carried by social justice movements 
(such as the civil rights movement in the US or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
in Mexico), which are manifestations of anti-hegemonic forces. These anti-hegemonic 
forces are crucial for Dussel because they function according to him as catalysts of 
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‘analectic moments’ where we identify with and affirm the lives of the oppressed. In the 
case of education, these anti-hegemonic forces, which have been at play for Dussel for 
decades, have helped to create at certain moments a critical consensus, such as the 
one that allowed in 1995 students but also families, churches and even whole 
communities to rally against Proposition 187.[7] Now, in doing so, these anti-hegemonic 
forces operate in accordance with the second key principle of Dussel’s ethics, which he 
calls the formal principle and expresses in the following way:      
There is critical validity in the community when the excluded victims, having 
recognized each other as distinct from the oppressive system, symmetrically 
participate in the agreements about what affects them while at the same time 
sustaining that critical consensus is grounded in rational argumentation and 
motivated by the drive of co-solidarity. (2013, 345) 
 This clearly shows that the formal principle is motivated by solidarity with those 
who are most oppressed, but its goal is the inclusion of oppressed victims as symmetric 
or equal participants in a transformative process that is based on rational 
argumentation. In virtue of this, the formal principle aims to achieve an ideal of equality. 
Now, Dussel does not consider equality as an abstract value that is given to us from the 
start (as in Rawls’ view of justice as fairness). Rather, equality is an achievement that 
emerges as the result of the progressive inclusion of those who are oppressed and the 
transformation of the political system. And, since this change or transformation is 
progressive, it is subject to several important constrains, which are taken into account 
by the third and last principle of Dussel’s ethics, which he calls the feasibility principle 
and expresses as follows:  
[…] who proposes to carry out or transform a norm, act, institution, and so on, 
cannot leave out of consideration the conditions of possibility of its objective, 
material and formal, empirical, technical, economic, political, and so on 
fulfillment, such that the act will be possible taking into account the laws of nature 
in general, and human laws in particular. (2003, 188) 
 This principle of feasibility articulates a notion of positive liberty –i.e., liberty that 
we have to transform things in accordance with certain constrains that are imposed on 
us both by natural and human laws, and by the goals of the two other principles (the 
material principle and the formal principle). Thus, in a nutshell, Dussel’s ethics of 
liberation can be described or characterized as follows: 
(A) It is an ethical system which values at its core solidarity with those who are 
most oppressed in society. 
(B) It is an ethical system which stresses that the only genuine way to manifest 
solidarity is through a political transformation (not a reform) of social and 
economic structures to include the oppressed as equal participants. 
(C) It is an ethical system in which political transformation is constrained by our 
capacity or liberty to act without violating either natural or human laws, or any 
prior commitments to solidarity and equality.   
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 Though there is far more to be said on how the three aforementioned principles 
are related to each other and how they are articulated by Dussel to develop a full blown 
ethical theory,[8] I will limit myself here to what I have presented above, which are the 
bare bones of his proposal. Indeed, my goal here is not to present in great detail an 
analysis of Dussel’s ethical proposal to evaluate both its advantages and shortcomings 
vis-à-vis other ethical views (for instance, utilitarianism), but rather just to suggest a 
potential application of Dussel’s overall view to the problem raised at the end of the 
second section of this paper, and I will do this in the following section. 
III.  An Application of Dussel’s Ethics of Liberation 
 As I mentioned previously, though the debate on affirmative action in regards to 
access to higher education has been remarkably enriching over the last fifty years, it 
has suffered from one serious limitation, which is the failure to address the point 
stressed by O’Connor when she penned the majority opinion in Bollinger. How can 
Dussel’s ethics of liberation help us to avoid turning affirmative action into a perennial 
policy while nonetheless staying true to the ideals of equality and justice that initially 
motivated it? Here is my suggestion. Given the distinction between political reform and 
political transformation introduced by Dussel,[9] one may argue along the following 
lines. 
 Although the initial goals of affirmative action in higher education –i.e., achieving 
equality and promoting diversity– are good and praiseworthy, affirmative action is flawed 
because it is a reformist policy that leaves intact the structural conditions that generate 
discrimination and oppression. Moreover, as a reformist policy that was implemented 
along a ‘top-down’ line by a series of Executive Orders or legislative decisions rather 
than by a ‘bottom-up’ anti-hegemonic movement, affirmative action is a product of an 
unjust and corrupt political and economic system, so it is not surprising that it often has 
perverse consequences, as the following story illustrates: 
The case of a young man who was a high school classmate of my daughters is 
also instructive. (…) he was a mature pleasant fellow, although he was not 
particularly bright, a fact reflected by his grades in high school. (…) But he had 
the good fortune of having had a Mexican American great-grandmother. He had 
no other connection to the Latino community. (…) The only living connection he 
had to anything Latino was through his friendship with my daughter. (…) When it 
came to applying for college, however, this young man, on the advice of his 
parents, applied to one of the premier universities in the nation and he got in. 
(Gracia 2008, 97)       
 In virtue of this, one possible solution (along roughly Dusselian lines) would be 
the following: in order to avoid similar cases, rather than spending time and effort to 
assess the merits of all potential candidates to higher education who claim minority 
status to determine if they should benefit from affirmative action or not, we should strive 
to achieve a political transformation of our system grounded on solidarity with those who 
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are most oppressed. The main rationale to undertake this, following Dussel, is that, in 
doing so, we would address the roots of the oppression and discrimination of 
marginalized individuals rather than its consequences. This is of crucial importance 
because, according to Dussel, the roots of this discrimination and oppression are not 
merely accidental features. Instead, they lie at the very core of the global political and 
economic system, the actions and policies of which are inconsistent with what it 
proclaims: 
The utopian project of the prevailing world system, which is becoming globalized, 
is revealed as being in contradiction with itself, given that the majority of its 
possible participants have become victims deprived of the ability to satisfy the 
needs that this same system has proclaimed as rights. (2013, 217) 
 Considering this, I contend that applying Dussel’s ethics of liberation to the issue 
of affirmative action regarding the access to higher education provides us with a way to 
reconcile what I take to be the crucial demands of both critics and advocates of 
affirmative action. Indeed, on one side, adopting an ethics of liberation would enable us 
to concede that affirmative action is a limited and flawed policy that violates the ideal of 
color-blind equality and that yields often perverse results, as its critics maintain.[10] And, 
on the other side, adopting an ethics of liberation would enable us to justify and strive 
for a transformation of the political and economic system in which, by embracing 
solidarity towards the oppressed victims and working to include them as equal 
participants, we would achieve the goals of the civil rights movement (i.e., social peace 
and social justice), which is what advocates of affirmative action have traditionally 
fought for.[11] Moreover, by adopting an ethics of liberation, I believe that we could in 
principle transcend the debates regarding the impacts of affirmative action on justice, 
equality and desert, by focusing on a more basic issue: how can we transform the 
structural conditions which initially motivated affirmative action? 
 This question, which is of paramount importance, has been recognized as being 
more pressing than problems that stem from the implementation of affirmative action. In 
particular, Nagel has raised this issue in the following manner: 
When we try to deal with the inequality in advantages that results from a disparity 
in qualifications (however produced) between races and sexes, we are up again 
a pervasive feature of the system (...) We must face the possibility that the 
primary injustice with which we have to contend lies in this feature itself, and that 
some of the worst aspects of what we now perceive as racial or sexual injustice 
are merely conspicuous manifestations of the great social injustice. (Nagel 1973, 
353) 
 However, though it is clear that Nagel is aware that both racial and gender 
discrimination (which have been used to justify affirmative action) are likely rooted in a 
larger and more pervasive feature of the current political and economic global 
system[12] he does not propose a feasible solution to tackle this great social injustice. 
In virtue of this, a more precise version of the above-mentioned question may be raised: 
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what means can we actually employ at a concrete and practical level within the context 
of higher education to accomplish this worthy goal?[13] Though I cannot provide here, 
given space limitations, a full account of how a Dusselian ethics of liberation could be 
used to answer this question, I will make in the following lines a tentative suggestion 
that outlines a feasible course of action to challenge this great social injustice.  
 Over a decade ago, several newspapers, businesses, faith organizations, school 
boards and higher education institutions in Colorado formed a coalition known as the 
Higher Education Access Alliance (HEAA) to support legislation that would offer in-state 
tuition for undocumented students.[14] Though there was considerable support from a 
large section of Colorado’s population for a tuition equity law (the ASSET bill) that would 
alleviate the situation that thousands of undocumented students residing in Colorado 
faced, many attempts to pass this legislation in the Colorado General Assembly failed. 
After the last failure in 2012, the President and the Board of Trustees of MSU Denver 
recognized that they were not compelled by law to establish for undocumented students 
that qualified as Colorado residents the same tuition rate set for out-of-state students 
and, consequently, they decided unilaterally to implement a nonresident unsubsidized 
tuition rate called the Colorado High School/GED Non-resident tuition rate for 
undocumented students. This tuition rate, though higher than the in-state one, was 
nevertheless significantly lower than the out-of-state rate. In doing so, MSU Denver 
affirmed its solidarity with the most vulnerable and oppressed group belonging to its 
student population (i.e., undocumented students, who often had immigrated with their 
parents from Latin American countries as children and had extremely limited financial 
resources to pay for a college education) and made an earnest effort to include them as 
equal participants in a transformative process through a policy that did not offer them a 
positive preference (as affirmative action does) but that attempted to challenge directly 
the great injustice that they were subject to. 
 In virtue of this actual example, one potential course of action that both 
advocates and critics of affirmative action can then follow consists in working both within 
and outside institutions of higher education to emulate the actions of MSU Denver in 
other states[15] in order to implement, if not full tuition-equity for undocumented 
students, at least tuition rates that are significantly lower than the out-of-state tuition 
rates. This course of action, which challenges the structural injustice that afflicts the 
most vulnerable and oppressed group of students, is consistent with Dussel’s principle 
of feasibility and also satisfies the material and formal principles.            
IV.  Conclusion 
 Let me recap. I have argued in this paper that Dussel’s ethics of liberation can be 
effectively used to tackle the debate on affirmative action regarding the access to higher 
education in the US. The main advantages of employing such a method are the 
following ones: on the one side, it would enable us to satisfy Justice O’Connor’s point 
regarding the need to avoid turning affirmative action into a perennial policy and, on the 
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other side, it would potentially enable us to satisfy what I consider to be the main 
demands of both opponents and advocates of affirmative action. Indeed, adopting an 
ethics of liberation would enable us to concede that affirmative action violates the ideal 
of a color-blind law, to justify the need to transform the current political and economic 
system to eliminate the structural conditions that give rise to the discrimination of racial 
minorities in the US and to undertake certain actions that effectively address (at least in 
a partial way) the great social injustice that initially motivated affirmative action. 
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Notes 
 [1] There are many cases that illustrate this tendency throughout history. See, for 
instance, Aristotle’s discussion of natural slavery in his Politics (1254b17-1255b39) and 
the use of his arguments by Juan Ginés de Sepulveda in On the just causes of the war 
with the Indians to justify the oppression of Indigenous populations in the American 
continent. 
 [2] For a recent discussion of the influence of Freire’s pedagogical views on the 
development of literacy campaigns (particularly in Chile and Nicaragua), see Kirkendall 
(2010). 
 [3] A clarification is important here. Though a number of theologians based in the 
US have made very substantial contributions that show how different liberation 
theologies can have a profound impact on oppressed and marginalized groups (e.g., 
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Isazi-Díaz 2004, De la Torre 2004, De la Torre and Aponte 2006), there has been little 
work on how Dussel’s specific writings and, in particular, his ethical views bear on 
issues of interest to oppressed and marginalized groups in the US. Since this is the 
project that I am pursuing in this paper, I will leave aside here the contribution of these 
other authors. 
 [4] For further discussion on the distinction between negative and positive rights, 
see Narveson (2001). 
 [5] It is important to point out here that even staunch defenders of affirmative 
action tend to be sensitive to the line of argument according to which it violates equality. 
For instance, Ezorsky (1991, 82) acknowledges the following: ‘According to this claim, 
all whites deserve to pay the cost of preferential treatment (hereafter, the desert claim). I 
do not accept the desert claim; indeed, I suggest that the criticism of racial preference 
as unfair to adversely affected whites is not without merit.’  
 [6] I am in agreement with this position, which is defended by Warnke (1998). 
 [7] For further details on the popular reaction to Proposition 187, before and after 
its vote, see Ono and Sloop (2002). 
 [8] For further discussion concerning the three principles of Dussel’s ethics of 
liberation, see Mendieta (1999) and Marsh (2000). 
 [9] For more details on the difference and opposition between reform and 
transformation, see Dussel (2008, 111-112). 
 [10] In addition to Abram, other opponents to affirmative action on the grounds 
that it violates the ideal of a color-blind society include Reynolds (1996) and Welch 
(1996). While I am in agreement with this point, the solution is not (as some people 
would have) to eliminate affirmative action by pretending, as Patrick (1996, 144) 
critically observes, that ‘discrimination is not still with us, or that it has no present 
widespread effects.’ Rather, a better solution involves, as I argue below, transforming 
the political and economic system that motivates the need of affirmative action policies 
in the first place. 
 [11] In particular, advocates of affirmative action such as Crosby and Herzberger 
(1996, 89) justify it by arguing that ‘to the extent that affirmative action arrests the trend 
toward bifurcated wealth in our nation, it contributes to economic and social stability.’ 
 [12] This feature, which lies in the contradictory nature of capitalism that destroys 
both the world and humanity (which are conditions of possibility of its own existence) as 
it defeats all barriers, is characterized by Dussel (2013, 39) in the following terms: 
‘Given that for Modernity nature is only a medium of production, nature fulfills its fate of 
being consumed and destroyed. In addition the by-products of that destruction 
accumulate on upon the Earth, until it jeopardizes the reproduction or survival of life 
itself. Life is the absolute condition of capital; its destruction destroys capital.’   
 [13] I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this question. What follows is an 
attempt to provide a partial answer to it that is consistent with Dussel’s principle of 
feasibility.  
 [14] For more details on this, see http://www.msudenver.edu/media/content/
presidentofficeof/6-20-12%20JBC%20Memo.pdf 
 [15] Colorado passed in 2013 along with three other states (New Jersey, 
Minnesota and Oregon) legislation that guarantees in-state tuition for undocumented 
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students meeting certain eligibility criteria. However, over half of the states in the US do 
not currently have such legislation and some states have laws barring undocumented 
students from receiving in-state tuition rates or prohibiting them from enrolling in their 
public higher education institutions. 
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